The issue of talking to terrorists or, for that matter, to foreign enemies has been a source of endless confusion. A large part of the problem stems from the erroneous assumption that talking (or diplomacy) and fighting (or force) are mutually exclusive alternatives. The assumption tends to be reinforced by sayings such as 'jaw jaw is better than war war' or the commonly quoted precept that one should never negotiate with terrorists, particularly in hostage situations where it is compared to surrendering to blackmail.
The portrayal of diplomacy or diplomatic solutions as an alternative to the use of force or military solutions also encourages people to think of the two modes as dichotomous. Another factor that influences the debate is that talks are often seen as according legitimacy to the parties involved. Thus, governments may be reluctant to enter into formal negotiations with representatives whose legitimacy they do not recognise.
A strong critic of the notion that negotiations should be viewed in this light has been Henry Kissinger. He famously castigated American governments during the Cold War for their unwillingness to enter into negotiations with communist states. At the same time Kissinger was just as critical of the notion that to demonstrate good faith during negotiations, it was necessary to suspend hostile activities against the party one was negotiating with. Kissinger was a firm believer in the value of coercive diplomacy or, as it was described by South African governments during the 1980s, 'thump and talk'. In this context, talking was more akin to interrogating and conveying threats to the other side than negotiating with a view to achieving a political compromise
Another erroneous assumption that regularly crops up in the debate on the subject of talking to terrorists is that negotiations are the only way that violent conflict can ever be brought to an end. It is quite commonly asserted that there will have to be talks eventually to deal with the challenge that dissident Republicans pose to our settlement. This contention is not supported by the history of other small groups engaged in covert violence directed at the achievement of a political objective. In fact, negotiated endings to such campaigns of violence tend to be the exception rather than the rule. That the Provisional IRA's long war led to negotiations on a new political dispensation here does not mean that the same path will inevitably be followed in the case of the dissidents. In particular, a fourth agreement, to follow the Good Friday, St Andrews, and Hillsborough Castle Agreements, so as to bring the dissidents into the process seems most unlikely. And a fresh settlement that overturned the principles embodied in those agreements can be entirely ruled out. The most the dissidents might conceivably achieve through negotiations would be the basis for a deal over their prisoners once dissident violence stopped altogether.
On the other hand there is nothing new in governments' communicating with violent groups over a range of matters. Even when there was no prospect whatsoever of wider political negotiations, there were channels of communication to all of Northern Ireland's paramilitary organisations over such matters as code words for bomb warnings to enable the police to distinguish between the activities of the paramilitary organisations and hoaxes or free-lance violence.
The readiness of both Republicans and Loyalists to co-operate with the RUC on this point showed how averse they were to false claims of responsibility. No doubt, the authorities are particularly keen at this time to be able to attribute particular attacks to the right dissident group, especially considering the proliferation of such groups. That provides an obvious motive for government to maintain or establish contact with any group that embarks on violence, even if the government's ultimate objective is that the ordinary processes of the criminal law should be used to suppress the group's activities.
So evidence of contact between an agent of the government and a member of violent revolutionary organisation indicates in itself very little, especially when accompanied by statements by the government disavowing any interest in formal political negotiations with the group in question. Of course, the authorities are likely to want to maintain secrecy for any contact there is with any violent organisation. But the fact that it becomes public knowledge that there have been contacts may have some political significance. Revealing the existence of such contacts can be a way of smoking out the intentions of the other side.
The recent talk about talks involving the dissidents may be intended to establish whether there is any interest among the dissidents in bringing their campaign to a close. If so, the reaction from the dissidents in emphatically rejecting talks suggests they have not yet come to the conclusion that their violence is politically futile.
