This is the second edition of Niall O'Dochartaigh's much
acclaimed study of the escalation of conflict in Derry between October
1968 and 1972.
When it first appeared in 1997 I foresaw it becoming one of
the key texts on the Troubles, and its status will undoubtedly continue
to grow, especially as this second paperback edition comes in at an
affordable price. O'Dochartaigh gives us a finely detailed, meticulous
analysis of how violent conflict escalated on the streets of Derry: how
'march gave way to gas gave way to sten' as Seamus Heaney put it in his
marvellous poem, 'Whatever you say say nothing'.
What O'Dochartaigh is offering is a description of how widely
differing political and social forces within the crucible that was
Derry in these years interrelated or sometimes didn't, and how this
process of confrontation and initial clashes shifted over time to
become a virtually self-sustaining cycle of violence – a situation
'where occasions of violent confrontation play a crucial role in
promoting the escalation and continuation of conflict'.
This is an outline of a sociological model of escalation, a
welcome addition to our understanding not only in NI but which is
applicable to other situations, especially to Iraq. Much of what the
Americans have been doing seems precisely what the British did in Derry
over 30 years ago. The scale is much worse, however. Fallujah has
witnessed dozens of Bloody Sundays. The amazing thing is that they are
surprised at the scale of the insurgency they themselves have largely
created.
Putting O'Dochartaigh's book on the US army reading list might not be a bad idea.
This second edition has been extended to include a new chapter on
the planning of Bloody Sunday and how the development of the military
operation for that day, Operation Forecast, ran counter to what had
been a relatively successful police management of the crisis, based on
an extensive though informal network of contacts established between
the nationalist community and the local RUC Chief Superintendent in
Derry, Frank Lagan. Lagan ('himself a Roman Catholic' as liberal
unionists used to say).
This system of contact and negotiation proved itself over and
over through 'not allowing a situation to become a situation', as they
say in the vocabulary of conflict resolution. But Lagan was not without
his critics. His style was one of conflict management, basically a
police operation, and based on negotiation and compromise between
tacitly recognised forces. This was anathema to General Sir Robert Ford
and behind him the Stormont government for whom state authority was not
a matter of negotiation or compromise with outside forces.
It was Ford who insisted on a direct confrontational approach
in Derry. Even if he planned Operation Forecast as a 'scoop' operation
against rioters he may well have conceived of it as a generally
punitive operation against what he termed the 'Bogside community' –
meaning Derry nationalists. The fact of making a large-scale military
operation against massed civilians was the direct cause of the
massacre.
But Ford could not have pushed through Operation Forecast
without political backing both from the Unionists at Stormont and from
the Heath Government at Westminster. Yet, even after all the
deliberations of the Saville Unquiry, no documentation of political
discussion of Ford's plan at NI or UK level has been found. Maybe it
never will…
