Robin Wilson thinks the Human Rights Commission is coming under pressure from Dublin to adopt a ‘two tribes’ approach to the Bill of Rights. Austen Morgan imagines that the human rights agenda is driven by nationalists and that Brice Dickson, and unnamed other ‘useful idiots’ (his offensive term), are part of a sinister plot linked to Sinn Féin and the CAJ. Arlene Foster advances similar arguments. Christine Bell and Inez McCormack resign from the Commission citing, inter alia, failures in its strategic direction. The SDLP, Sinn Féin and the Human Rights Consortium write to the Commission criticising its decision to arrange seminars on the Bill of Rights process. The debate on the Commission and the Bill of Rights process has certainly intensified. I have written elsewhere on the content of the Joint Declaration. But what is going on in this current argument about the Commission’s work on the Bill of Rights?
Austen Morgan’s comments reflect a misreading of current events and can be set aside. The thought that Brice Dickson is at present pursuing a CAJ and/or republican agenda is, in the circumstances, quite amusing. So, Austen should be thanked for providing some light relief. Robin Wilson’s views are grounded in a particular view of the Good Friday Agreement and reflect his own well-established political position. This view, which is widely shared in certain circles in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, is having an influence on the current debate on the Bill of Rights, and it would seem on the Human Rights Commission. It merits careful attention. The argument is that the Agreement’s approach to group rights is a modern form of apartheid which is illiberal. By creating the categories of ‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’, and placing them at the democratic core of the Agreement, sectarian divisions have been perpetuated. The way forward, in this view, is multi-ethnic integration and the creation of legal and political mechanisms which would moderate attachments to communal identity. Those who share this view effectively believe that the Agreement got it wrong by opting for a consociational model of conflict management. They would like to see multi-ethnic integration as the driving force behind the political process. They think the Bill of Rights should take us down this path.
There are several responses which can be made to this argument. First, when put to the electoral test this position never gathers overwhelming support. In other words, there is little evidence that people in Northern Ireland are persuaded by the argument.
Secondly, the suggestion that people’s preferences are dictated by ‘ethno-political entrepreneurs’ is just plain condescending. Irish nationalists and British unionists really do exist. They consistently demand recognition of their existence through their political representatives. Many do find the concept ‘parity of esteem’ troubling, and for reasons which make good sense, however, the political demand for it comes from real people. The empirical evidence is there to suggest that people do want their political aspirations recognised. Irish nationalists, with some justification, point to the fact that their identity has now been recognised as ‘equally legitimate’.
Thirdly, and perhaps the strongest argument, is the democratic mandate of the Agreement. The Agreement sides with consociationalism as its democratic core. It recognises that the political aspirations of Irish nationalists and British unionists are equally legitimate. Note that the Agreement talks of political aspirations and not particular religious beliefs. Parity of esteem is mentioned several times as a central concept and the Agreement requires equal treatment of the identity and ethos of the two main communities. This is not ‘tribal’, it is recognition of the reality of divergent political aspirations and reflects a genuine attempt to manage the conflict. Both governments continue to insist that the Agreement is the only way forward. The template is likely to remain the core of political progress into the future. Those who work within the Agreement in all its institutions, whatever their private political view of it, should be prepared to accept that it is the conflict management strategy which has been accepted and endorsed.
Fourthly, and this is not stressed enough, there is nothing illiberal about nationalism or group rights, as the work of Will Kymlicka, Joseph Raz and Yael Tamir has surely demonstrated. Any good liberal should know that communal life is as central a part of personal autonomy as anything else. Much contemporary liberal thinking recognises the value of communal and cultural life to the individual.
The final point I want to make is about specific contexts and perceptions. Irish nationalists have worked for a considerable time to win acceptance of power-sharing and the right to formal recognition of their political aspirations. Remember that for a long time unionism stressed the importance of ‘normal’ democracy (crude majoritarianism) and rejected power-sharing. Reform of policing was resisted and discrimination against Catholics was continually denied. The aspirations of the Irish community were consistently sneered at. When Irish nationalists hear reference to multi-ethnic integration they naturally are concerned that their gains will be lost. This sounds like another subtle ‘liberal unionist’ attempt to promote an internal ‘integrationist’ UK approach which will undermine their key political demands. It is the DUP which talks of ‘normal’ democracy now and points to the situation in Scotland and Wales.
The rejection of the Agreement’s approach to groups has direct implications for a representative policing service, attempts to tackle discrimination in the work force and potentially puts power-sharing in danger. Surely the Human Rights Commission, and others, must see why Irish nationalists are concerned?
The legal mechanisms which exist in Northern Ireland are there to achieve just outcomes based on the reality of divergent political aspirations and continuing discrimination in, for example, employment against Catholics. The institutional recognition of groups is there to achieve fair outcomes and build confidence and trust between the two main political communities. The aim of this conflict management approach is not to institutionalise ‘tribalism/sectarianism’ – a label which is in fact inaccurate. It is to get the two main communities (which really exist) to work together over time within all the new institutions. The view of most is that this is the way to ensure peace and stability.
In my view, an institution which owes its existence to the Agreement should respect the conflict management strategy which it reflects. It does not promote multi-ethnic integration as the way forward. Many may regret that it does not, but that argument has little support in Northern Ireland. This means accepting that Irish nationalists and British unionists do really exist and their views cannot just be written off as ‘tribal’ or ‘sectarian’. The Bill of Rights process should not become a vehicle for undermining the Agreement and eroding its core protections. For those who feel unable to respect the terms of the Agreement, and who work within the institutions created under it, there is an obvious exit strategy.
