Why is the Prime Minister so optimistic about the prospects of a political settlement in Northern Ireland? Surely the two extremes – Sinn Féin and the DUP – were strengthened in the General Election? Mr David Trimble finally lost his seat in Parliament; but this is not just a matter of personal significance, Mr Blair has achieved nothing in Ulster since his erstwhile ally Mr Trimble lost the leadership role within Unionism in the Assembly elections of 2003. Yet the Prime Minister does have his reasons to be cheerful.
Last Autumn he almost cajoled the DUP into a deal with Sinn Féin. He managed to get both sides to agree an outline political structure for Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister broke the DUP's apparently strong negotiating position in a number of key areas. The DUP, for example, had insisted upon a long quarantine period during which the sincerity of the IRA's commitment to peaceful means be tested. In the end that quarantine period became a few short weeks during which legislative matters had to be sorted out anyway. Above all the DUP, like David Trimble before them, was forced onto an almost exclusive focus upon the issue of IRA decommissioning. The broader issue of the IRA's continued role was pushed to one side. It is also important to note – by virtue of brilliant draftmanship – that the DUP were pushed a significant way down the road to acceptance of Sinn Féin holding either the Ministry for policing or justice in Northern Ireland.
The Prime Minister now expects that, within a few weeks, the IRA will carry out a major act of decommissioning and, quite conceivably, claim to have divorced itself from Sinn Féin. It will announce 'a new mode' under which, we will be led to believe, all the nasty stuff of recent history – gun-running, bank robberies, espionage operations, link-ups with international terrorism, murder and brutality – will all stop. The DUP will then be squeezed. They will be told that this is too good an offer to refuse and, in Mr Blair's mind, they will crack on key points of their agenda as they cracked last Autumn.
Mr Blair therefore has a serious chance of success. But he also has a massive problem which does not appear to be fully grasped in Downing Street. The way the negotiation collapsed last Autumn has left an important legacy. The front line DUP leadership was, in a sense, humouring Mr Blair because they were confident that the IRA would not give the necessary transparency (photographic evidence of an act of decommissioning). In this respect the DUP was better informed about the IRA's real intentions than the two governments. But there were those in the second rank of the DUP leadership subjectively keen for a deal. These modernisers have been weakened by events since then. It soon became clear – thanks to authoritative Irish government briefings – that in last year's negotiations the British government had no serious anti-criminality agenda. The Northern Bank raid was the IRA's response to this perceived weakness.
There are two profound consequences. The so-called DUP modernisers who tried to edge Dr Paisley into a Sinn Féin's arms have lost authority within the party. The general election has further strengthened the hard line element within the DUP. Even more profoundly the whole question of the future status of the IRA – brilliantly suppressed by the two governments in 2004 – is now at the forefront of the agenda. During the election campaign the DUP insisted, for example in the Belfast Newsletter of the 2 May 2005, that complete disbandment of the IRA was a necessary requirement of any future deal.
The Sinn Féin leadership, on the other hand, has made it clear that the IRA will not disband or stand down and the two governments appear to accept this. There also appears still to be no agreement as to the total amount of arms held by the IRA and a clear belief in government circles that the intention is to retain a significant amount of weaponry. In short the IRA is not offering to give up the means of coercion and few really believe that it intends to extinguish its criminal empire. At best a shadowy organisation is offering to become more shadowy in its operations, not to go away but possibly not to embarrass too openly.
In return it expects not just a premier place in government but control of police or justice. Quite an achievement for an organisation that both governments have described in recent weeks as the largest criminal organisation in Europe. But that is the nature of Mr Bair's strategy. But he has difficulties. Some of the DUP are already looking past Mr Blair to Gordon Brown as the man they will have to deal with. The same applies – somewhat more reluctantly – to Sinn Féin.
Most profoundly there has been a shift in unionist political attitudes. As long as Mr Trimble retained the leadership of unionism, which effectively he did until the Assembly elections of 2003, he also kept the bulk of unionist public opinion, in principle, in favour of the project of the Agreement. Since then all serious polling evidence suggests a collapse in that sentiment. Most unionists now simply do not have the trust in the IRA which would permit a deal of the sort Mr Blair wants. More profoundly, they do not have the trust they once had in Mr Blair.
In his famous speech at the Belfast Harbour Commission in 2002, the Prime Minister eloquently attacked the idea of a double standard for democracy on the island of Ireland. He made it clear that he could not accept that there should be a different standard for access to government indifferent parts of Ireland. However, this crucial concept has been quite forgotten in recent times. The Irish government insists that the IRA must disband before Sinn Féin is admitted to the government in Dublin. However, neither the Irish nor the British government insists that disbandment must occur before their admission to the government of the North. It was this double standard which broke Mr Trimble. Will it also break the DUP?
Professor Paul Bew is a specialist in Irish political affairs at Queen's University, Belfast.
