My reaction to the Stevens report was mixed. What it revealed wasn't unexpected and yet I found it shocking.
I question the use of the word collusion, despite Sir John's attempts to elucidate. A loyalist friend has argued that collusion implies a degree of equality as well as shared understanding and objectives and this didn't exist.
Loyalists knew the security forces were infiltrating their organisations – as well as those of republicans – and in some cases appeared to know precisely who was involved.
It was not so much collusion as gathering intelligence, recruiting informers, trying to influence thinking and, as suspected, instigating the killing of some of those deemed dangerous.
Loyalists have long been suspicious about security force activities and about the intentions of the British establishment. Generally they don't sit easily with security people and, in the early days at least, they would have found it difficult to consciously collude – although many, like many republicans, had British army training.
State agencies, at times, may have manipulated loyalists but at other times it was loyalists manipulating their security force handlers.
I also found the Stevens report and the commentary based on it disquieting because the central theme remained that of collusion in the killing or attempted killing of nationalists/Catholics.
Clearly this was a major, disturbing element but the security forces were unlikely to have been entirely sectarian in their approach and there remains suspicion about the violent deaths of certain loyalists, notably Tommy Herron, a former UDA leader who, at one point, declared war on the British army.
Loyalists had some inkling about collusion between the republican leadership and the British government. Suspicion was particularly acute in 1972 when leading republicans met members of the British cabinet.
This sent shockwaves through loyalism, stimulating fear of secret deals being hatched to the detriment of unionism. The result was increased loyalist violence – aimed indirectly at a British government who appeared to be pandering to republican terrorists but focused on the nationalist community. If the British establishment was prepared to appease republicans, then loyalists reasoned that they would have to demonstrate that they were also capable of horrific violence.
Loyalists were also aware of the activities of the Republic's establishment and intelligence services. Rumours, later confirmed, circulated about the involvement of Irish government ministers in the north.
There was also concern about Irish collusion with republicans, the supply of arms to northern nationalists, the instigation of a return to physical force in the shape of the Provisional movement, exportation of violence north to protect the Irish state from radical republicanism.
Loyalists also knew of plans by the southern establishment to destabilise Northern Ireland. The Irish army would cross the border and politicians would call for UN intervention, leading to an 'international incident'.
The IRA was at war with unionists and the British state and engaged in a ruthless terror campaign that ignored the most basic rules of war in a murderous sectarian conflict.
Those delegated to fight terrorism inevitably became embroiled in a nasty downward spiral. In this they were not unique because police forces throughout the world are prone to the same tendency. 'Them and us' feelings permeate the ranks of all security forces facing organised terrorists or criminals and the Garda was reportedly more ruthless in suppressing dissidents than the RUC.
I once heard an RUC man from a rural area referring to the rioting 'thugs and scum' of the Shankill and the Falls. For most RUC personnel there was no significant difference between the working class 'thugs' who formed a common, if bitterly divided, foe.
Yet ordinary people in these streets were engaged in a life and death struggle defending their own communities and few politicians crossed the divide to offer the obvious message that none of this was conducive to a better world.
There were attempts to glorify 'martyrs' and lionise militant politicians. Power struggles continued, the people suffered; their suffering even all the more devastating when it was suspected that state agencies were involved.
Today loyalist and republican prisoners, including those who are engaged in unspeakable brutality, have been released. Other 'on the runs' seem unlikely to have to face the full rigours of the law. The supposed protectors of the community colluded with violence and there are no clean hands.
Despite this, the emphasis must not be on retribution but upon ensuring that we never go through this again. We can never know the full truth about the wasted years but the words of a South African memorial near Soweto township should be engrained in our hearts and minds: never again.
