There are mistakes and there are fundamental mistakes. All are inclined to catch up with you but fundamental ones are more likely to catch you by the throat and choke you.
The most fundamental mistake made in the construction of the Good Friday Agreement was the position taken up by the British government. It declared that it was neutral in the struggle between British unionism and Irish nationalism. This definition of neutrality embraced the seemingly ethically correct and benign position that Britain would refrain from ever becoming a persuader between the two conflicting political philosophies.
This decision resulted in the anomaly whereby all the people living on the island of Ireland, nationalist and dissenter, had a voice and a vote in the acceptance or rejection of the Good Friday Agreement but the majority of the British people – the English, the Scots and the Welsh – had no such voice or vote.
While it is true that the British political system is less favourably disposed to the system of decision by referendum, preferring the primacy of parliament, it also has to be acknowledged that in more recent times most of the great constitutional changes have involved a referendum.
The argument that the Welsh and the Scots held an internal referendum to decide on their devolved status does not hold water in the Republic of Ireland and therefore could not be defined as solely an internal matter.
But even if one were to accept the flawed logic of the constitutional change being an internal matter particular to Northern Ireland that, in itself, misinterprets and misunderstands the tenacity and the intransigence of the British/Irish conflict. This anomaly was a reversal of the old dictat much loved by unionists in the past that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'. In effect, it means that a tiny majority of the Ulster unionist people, who form only a tiny minority of the British people, have an equal stature with the totality of the nationalist vote and a veto over the rest of the British people and the remainder of the unionist vote.
That position results in the inherent weakness of allowing some unionist politicians to make the rightful claim that the Good Friday Agreement cannot and will not work without the consent of those who make up a majority of the unionist populace, even when they only account for a fraction of the people who see the agreement as the only honourable and peaceful road out of the age-old conflict. That is the fundamental mistake and it does not place the British government and the British people in a neutral position.
It means that the piper has no power and the people who pay the piper have neither say nor influence.
It is the worst of politics and no government should allow itself to be placed in that position and, despite the clever posturing of some unionist politicians, it is inherently anti-democratic.
On the day the IRA ceasefire was called way back in 1994, I was in the company of a Presbyterian minister. I was in the best form, judging the ceasefire to be the beginning of great possibilities for the future.
I had longed for that day, convinced that only when the British government and the republican movement entered talks and negotiations could there be any prospects for peace and settlement. The conversation between us on that day shocked and disturbed me. "Unionists are not ready for this", the Presbyterian minister said. "They would prefer that the war and the violence go on for another 20 years rather than see the government negotiate and deal with republicans."
He went on to elaborate that most of the unionists he knew would tolerate and even prefer the violence and disruption that was then present rather than be forced into a position where they would have to negotiate and compromise with their sworn enemy.
On that day I refused to allow my optimism to be dented and judged that his words and analysis were extreme and misplaced. No one, surely, would prefer death and violence to a political settlement even if some aspects of it were hard to swallow. On this day it is I who have to revise and examine my analysis. It is clear that there are many unionists who would tolerate and even prefer violence and disruption rather than have a former IRA man sit at the heart of government.
Had the Good Friday Agreement moved apace then the dynamic released would have swept the doubters and objectors aside or into the flow of change.
That has not happened and the postponement of an election beyond the autumn could result in a vacuum that is much more dangerous than many would appear to recognise.
That vacuum could encourage unionists to sit on their hands for the next 20 years, blocking change where and if they can and insisting that security be placed at the top of the political agenda.
The price that will be paid for that will be a return to violence and death. The republican tradition cannot and will not tolerate a future without change. The violence will not be on the same scale of ferocity that we have come to know during the last 30 years but it will be enough to sweep aside the institutions and the people who formed and implemented an agreement that gave us all a way out of our pathetic history.
During the coming months the British government will remind all the other participants of the mistakes that each of them has made during the last few years. Rightly so. They are unlikely to admit, however, the fundamental mistake they made in depriving their own people of a say and a vote in the future of our two islands.
That mistake, if not rectified, might deprive us of the one potent dynamic capable of putting the agreement back on the rails.
