Last week's IRA statement rejected all demands to disarm and disband and, instead, reiterated traditional republican rhetoric about "a united, independent and free Ireland" and paradoxically referred to "the search for a just and lasting peace" and the removal "of the causes of conflict". The real cause of conflict is the voices of dead generations who call for Irish unity at all costs. No single group, dead or alive, has the right to arbitrate on the future shape of political relationships in these islands.
How can the IRA speak seriously of unity after literally blasting fellow Irish unionists and nationalists for more than a quarter of a century? How could an independent Ireland, or 32-county state be sustained in isolation from Europe? Perhaps it is just independence from England – that never failing source of all our ills – that is being sought?
The prosperity of the Celtic tiger was, however, a consequence, not of some illusory form of independence, but rather of membership of the European Union.
Ironically, the IRA still claims a total commitment to peace. This leads it to blame the British military establishment, loyalist murder gangs and unionists for the(ir) political difficulties.
They seldom say it aloud, but they also place blame on other shoulders. Belfast's Sinn Féin Lord Mayor Alex Maskey recently explained that the Irish government must shoulder some of the blame. The Irish government had failed primarily to develop what he calls all-Ireland institutions, which Sinn Féin is "most keen to see developed to its maximum extent". They also failed to ensure that Patten was implemented "without amendment". It seems we must have a type of policing that satisfies Sinn Féin demands alone.
It is now almost 10 years since the British and Irish governments, in the Downing Street declaration of 1993, stated that 'the achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence'. It was only in these circumstances that democratic parties commited to "abide by the democratic process" could join in dialogue with governments and political parties. A refusal to disarm and disband an army that is interlinked with a government party hardly demonstrates willingness to abide by democratic norms.
Unionists in 1993 were understandably reticent about engaging with Sinn Féin, which had not established a commitment to democratic politics alone. Yet unionists recognised that a heavily armed terrorist army would face difficulties in disarming and disbanding. Still, they eventually took the risk in the interests of the common good.
After the ceasefire was 'restored' in July 1997, unionists courageously entered into discussions with other parties, including Sinn Féin, leading eventually to the power-sharing arrangements envisaged in the agreement of 1998. Credit must be given to the DUP who, by their presence, endorsed these arrangements – something they had rejected for decades, even without Sinn Féin.
The Belfast Agreement was also based upon a "total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means... (and) opposition to any use or threat of force". Like the other parties, Sinn Féin was committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of relationships throughout these, our islands. This commitment, if adhered to, should remove the threat of coercion even if 51% were ever to endorse some form of Irish unity.
To coerce the other 49% would be to reject 'mutual respect' and return to the violence we had hopefully left behind.
Five years after the Good Friday Agreement the primary difficulty remains the inability or unwillingness of the republican movement to finally relinquish the crutch of a private army. Internationally there was some sympathy with the victimhood portrayed by republicans before the September 11 attacks on the twin towers. That sympathy is fast being eroded as we move into a more uncertain world in which terrorism threatens everyone.
Nor should we ever equate private armies with state forces and installations.
Despite this retrograde IRA statement, grounds for hope remain because most people know that a return to violence would be disastrous and would not have support. There is logic to the peace process and we must hope that this logic, rather than the madness of violence, prevails in the days that lie ahead.
