The Good Friday Agreement, for all its popular backing in 1998, remains a strangely unloved document. Beyond most of the main political parties, and both governments, it is surprising how few of those living in Northern Ireland are prepared to argue for its core principles. The principles underpinning the Agreement are often derided by commentators and its complex design reduced to the lazy and inaccurate short-hand of 'institutionalised sectarianism'. The result is the odd situation that politicians and others trying to manage a conflict of national identity find themselves labelled 'sectarian'. This may have something to do with how the Agreement was drafted. While people were given the chance to vote on it, 'partnership government' stopped short of offering them a say on the detail. A sense of genuine ownership has always been absent and the problem has been exacerbated by the management of the process. The troubling message is that Northern Irish voters (and after the events of the last few weeks some of the political parties) just cannot be trusted to say or do the right thing. They have evidently heard the message and are acting accordingly. The election provides a welcome opportunity to see what people think in 2003. In a democracy people have the right to make the wrong decisions.
Those who have written off the Agreement are rightly asked for realistic alternatives. But another question is: which key concepts in the Agreement would they like to see dropped? What exactly is it about the Agreement that is 'sectarian'? Surely not its focus on national identity and the conflict at the heart of Northern Irish politics? Looking again at the Agreement it is difficult to see what aspects of it could be discarded by anyone seeking genuine agreement. It is, of course, as some suggest, possible to separate principles from institutional mechanisms. But let's be clear: if some mechanisms are not in place then the principles are not being complied with. There is no sense pretending otherwise as a way out of the current difficulties. Do not forget, and regardless of much self-serving talk of ambiguity, the Agreement is quite straightforward on much of this. Problems do exist on the lack of alternative options where the established mechanisms fail to achieve the Agreement's principal objectives. Any 'Plan B', if it is to secure agreement, will have to cover much the same ground as the Good Friday Agreement.
A considerable amount of hope is being invested in the proposed Review. The prospect of a Review does offer scope for some reflection on how the Agreement has functioned. But again, this will be rather different from renegotiation. A Review will offer the opportunity to fine-tune existing mechanisms so as not to defeat through legal means the political purpose of the Agreement. It should not become a cover for the destruction of core principles. It is hard to believe that the pro-Agreement political parties and both governments would allow this to happen.
Let's think about the structure of the Agreement and the core principles. In my view, none of these concepts could be dropped without also sacrificing the agreement of key political actors in Northern Ireland. All the basic building blocks are of equal value and no hierarchy is intended.
First, there is the constitutional guarantee. Acceptance of the principle of consent has always been a key theme for both unionists and constitutional nationalists. The Agreement reflects its importance. Would unionists welcome its removal? Do unionists wish to see a return to the old version of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution? The consent principle rests the constitutional status of Northern Ireland on persuasion. How persuasive will the unionist case be in the longer term for the majority of people in Northern Ireland? Can nationalists advance a suitably inclusive and attractive version of Irishness and/or a robust pragmatic argument in favour of Irish unity?
Second, is the concept of power-sharing, or partnership government, anchored in the idea of parity of esteem between the two main national communities. Nationalists have argued strongly for a form of government that would ensure their active participation, banish forever past exclusion and remove the conditions which prompted endemic abstentionism. Would nationalists really drop this demand in exchange for parity with the democratic systems in Scotland and Wales? Today unionist parties are more likely to be tempted by abstentionism. There is a suspicion that to many unionists direct rule would be more palatable than the prospect of power-sharing. Given the binational nature of the Agreement, nationalists can rightly argue that direct rule should not be the default position any longer. And it is fair to say that many unionists can see the good sense in having representative democracy in Northern Ireland. The real debate is on institutional design. In order to make power-sharing between nationalists and unionists work, designation will remain important. It is, however, not evident that this must include a requirement to secure a majority in each of the two main communities for the election of the First and Deputy First Minister. A debate over other ways to gain majority backing without necessarily collapsing the institutions should take place. It may well become more important to secure a sufficient overall majority without relying excessively on concurrent majorities within nationalism and unionism. Whatever happens to the procedures within the Assembly, the principle of power-sharing will survive.
Third, is the all-Ireland dimension. The Agreement has binationalism at its core. National aspirations are equally legitimate. The pursuit of a united Ireland through democratic means is, again, recognised as legitimate. Structures are in place to reflect this commitment. Most accept the need for such all-Ireland co-operation whether it is regarded as a stepping-stone to eventual unity or not. Having gained this through the Agreement which nationalist party could ever retreat from the established position?
Fourth, is British-Irish co-operation. This has two elements. The first is the ongoing work between the two governments and their officials. Again, the Agreement provides a structure to reflect this. The second is co-operation between all the democratic entities on these islands. Often viewed as a concession to unionism, this provides a useful forum for dialogue and learning across established international borders. The British-Irish Council is the institution established to reflect the principle. Would unionists give up this link to the other devolved entities? Would the Irish government really retreat from the intergovernmental approach established in the Agreement?
Fifth, is the group of principles relating to justice, equality and rights. Several participants have stressed the importance of human rights and equality. There is ongoing disagreement about the nature and scope of the principles, but few now suggest that they are not important values which a democracy should respect. The struggles and disagreements are over the application of the concepts in practice. And on this we need to know who has the last word and on what basis (a question which I think still has not been given enough attention). Another factor in this is more comprehensive reform of existing institutions. Institutional transformation of the police and the criminal justice system was a particular concern of nationalists and human rights groups (and many professionals within both systems). What this concern reflects is the sensible idea that to bring about a meaningful transition you need thorough institutional change. Who would really remove the guarantees that currently exist? Who would really end the processes that are already ongoing?
And finally, the overriding commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic means. The aim is to create a 'demilitarised' society whereby both state and non-state actors commit themselves to bring the conflict to a decisive end. This principle is reflected in several practical commitments and a variety of evolving mechanisms (some of which are outside the terms of the Agreement). No one, one hopes, seeks a return to the levels of violence of the past? Who could disagree that Northern Ireland must move decisively to 'normalisation' and that paramilitarism should end?
This is no doubt a simplification of many complex matters. The argument is, however, straightforward: the building blocks of the current Agreement will remain central to political progress in Northern Ireland and any 'Plan B' would simply have to include them if genuine agreement is sought. Those who talk of renegotiation must ask themselves how they will combine all of the concepts and principles listed above in a way that makes agreement possible. I suspect what we are really talking about is not a new deal that is a radical departure from the Agreement, but the fine-tuning of the existing institutions and mechanisms within the context of a Review. This is not an accident. The institutions reflect the core values of the Agreement. And the Good Friday Agreement simply addresses the basics needed to secure the consent of the main political actors in Northern Ireland. In any Review, we will, it seems, be talking about making the building blocks of peace contained in the Good Friday Agreement work more effectively. The existing legal mechanisms should not necessarily be allowed to displace the overriding political purpose of the Agreement.
Professor Colin Harvey, School of Law, University of Leeds.
