Former taoiseach Albert Reynolds is regarded as one of the key players who brought about the republican and loyalist ceasefires in 1994. However, 10 years on the peace process remains in limbo with the Stormont assembly in suspension for nearly two years and both loyalist and republican paramilitaries accused of involvement in murder.
Barry McCaffrey, speaks to the former taoiseach to identify the difficulties encountered in brokering the 1994 ceasefires and to discover what has gone wrong in the intervening decade.
Almost immediately after succeeding Charles Haughey as taoiseach in February 1992 Albert Reynolds agreed to suspend the Anglo-Irish Agreement to allow for all-party talks in the north.
However when those talks failed Mr Reynolds took the unprecedented step of opening up secret channels with the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries.
Alongside those secret channels the former taoiseach was engaged in a process with then British Prime Minister John Major to bring republicans and loyalists in from the cold.
Mr Reynolds realised the significance of talks already taking place between John Hume and Gerry Adams and agreed to adopt their proposals, which would eventually become the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993.
Regarded as the archetypal political deal-maker Albert Reynolds was not afraid to blame both the British government and elements of the republican movement when the talks process threatened to break down in early 1994.
However in the run-up to the IRA ceasefire the former taoiseach was instrumental in persuading Bill Clinton to allow IRA veteran Joe Cahill to travel to America despite the fact that he had been banned from the US for nearly 30 years.
Despite the political risk to his credibility Mr Reynolds insists that building trust with republicans and loyalists was a key part to delivering ceasefires.
Days after the IRA's ceasefire announcement, Mr Reynolds joined hands with Gerry Adams and John Hume on the steps of Leinster House for a photograph which unionists feared was the beginning of a 'pan-nationalist front'.
When the UDA and UVF ceasefires were announced six weeks later it appeared the Longford businessman's efforts had ensured his place in Irish history was guaranteed as a political 'peacemaker'.
However within weeks Mr Reynolds found himself ousted as taoiseach and was forced to watch the events which would unfold in the months and years that followed, from outside the centre of political power.
Admitting to a sense of disappointment when he was forced to vacate the taoiseach's office at the dawn of his finest hour, Mr Reynolds says: "When I had to stand down as taoiseach at the end of 1994 I had to accept it, because that's what happens in politics.
"But I do feel a sense of disappointment that 10 years on people still haven't managed to complete the work that was started back then.
"The two main aims I had when I was elected taoiseach in 1992 was to try and bring about peace in Ireland and to strengthen the economy in order to stem the tide of people who were immigrating from Ireland at the time."
Mr Reynolds said that few people took him seriously when he first announced his intentions back in 1992.
"People thought I was mad and that it could never be achieved," he said.
"But when the breakthrough came in the peace process in 1994 it proved to be a major contribution to the prosperity that came afterwards, both north and south.
"My sole interest in the peace process was to try and save lives by getting the different organisations to call a halt to the killings."
Senior loyalists privately admit they found it easier to deal with the Irish government than their British counterparts in John Major's government.
"From the beginning I recognised that loyalists had to be fully involved in the process, otherwise it wouldn't work."
In a telling admission, Mr Reynolds reveals he had been guaranteed a loyalist ceasefire even before the IRA cessation had been secured.
"It was the loyalist paramilitaries who were the first group to agree to a ceasefire even before the IRA took their decision.
"They made an agreement with me that they would call their ceasefires six weeks after the IRA, if they were satisfied that republicans were genuine.
"You had to try and understand where the loyalists and unionists were coming from and when I was taoiseach that is what I tried to do.
"I told the loyalist organisations that the demographics in the north were changing, whether they liked it or not.
"I asked if it wouldn't be better for them to work out a better future for their people now, rather than spending the next 30 years killing each other.
"I told the republicans they weren't going to win a war, so what was the point in having any more people dying?
"I encouraged them to look at the situation from a political perspective and I could see over a period of time they were thinking that way themselves.
"In fairness, they kept their word to me at all times.
"I told John Major these people had never broken their word to me and he should trust them.
"I always believed people in the north were straight talkers and they appreciated you more if you did the same."
But the former taoiseach can not hide his sense of frustration at the events following his departure from office which led to the collapse of the IRA's ceasefire on February 9 1996.
"I knew what brought about the breakdown in the IRA's ceasefire, because I was told in advance," he said.
"The British government had made an agreement to bring Sinn Féin into talks after the 1994 ceasefire, but they broke that deal.
"I warned the Irish government at the time that things were breaking down and it was very serious."
However Mr Reynolds believes the British government made a series of crucial mistakes during this period of the peace process.
"They made a huge mistake not to keep their word about bringing Sinn Féin into talks but then they made an even bigger mistake when the IRA ceasefire was restored by allowing Sinn Féin straight into talks," he said.
"By doing that they showed the hardline people in the republican movement, who had consistently opposed the ceasefire, that they were justified in believing the only way you could force the British government to change its mind was through the use of force.
"Those mistakes made it more difficult to restore a ceasefire again and ensure that it held."
A key difficulty which repeatedly dogged the peace process during the 1990s was the issue of decommissioning and whether it had been agreed during negotiations prior to the IRA ceasefire.
Albert Reynolds believes the British government made a crucial mistake in making the decommissioning issue a prerequisite to progress.
"Decommissioning was never on top of the agenda in the negotiations leading up to the ceasefires," Mr Reynolds said.
"I always requested it be kept at the bottom of the agenda because I knew the problems it would cause."
Insisting the issue was seriously mishandled, the former taoiseach said: "There was always going to be a proper time when the decommissioning issue could have been solved.
"I believe that time would have come if people had stuck to the agreed process.
"It was never made an issue during my time as taoiseach but was made an issue by others who came afterwards.
"I believe that was a serious mistake because it created a dangerous situation which put the whole process under threat."
However when the IRA did carry out its first act of decommissioning in October 2001, followed by two subsequent acts, Albert Reynolds admits to a sense of personal satisfaction.
"I felt it was a start to them going down the right road," he said.
"When the situation is right I believe they will do so again.
"Eventually all of the groups will have to decommission.
"But there are different people in charge now than there were in 1994.
"They have to have time to bring the organisations with them and there has to be some kind of process in place to encourage them to take these steps."
While he regards the decade since the ceasefires as having been a success, Mr Reynolds believes that even more should have been achieved.
"Even though there have been a lot of changes over the last 10 years I am frustrated that the parties still haven't managed to see the process through to the end.
"I can appreciate that there are political and other kinds of difficulties but I would like to the think that people could celebrate the anniversary of the ceasefires by making a renewed effort to complete the process.
"I still believe it is achievable, but you have to have courage and people on all sides have to take risks.
"That is what political leadership is all about."
Suggesting that the political impasse might be helped by the introduction of an international negotiator, such as the role played by George Mitchell in the negotiations which brought about the Good Friday Agreement, the former taoiseach said: "If both sides find it is more practical and easier for them to deal through an intermediary then let us look at that option.
"There are a whole list of things which still have to be done.
"It is a question of people sitting down and getting on with it.
"If people sat down and worked together I have no doubt they would be amazed at the agreement which could be achieved.
"But the governments must take the lead.
"The only people who are benefiting from the current political vacuum is the hardliners on both sides."
