The key lesson drawn by the British army from 37 years of engagement in Northern Ireland is that a "Troubles tsar" type figure should be appointed in similar situations in the future.
As Operation Banner – the army's codename for its deployment in the Troubles – finally ends with further troop withdrawals this month, The Irish News has seen an internal analysis conducted by senior British officers.
The review of the longest-running operation in British army history concludes: "The critical issue is the necessity of engaging all relevant agencies in early substantive visible action for reform in order to prevent insurgency or civil war breaking out or potential insurgents exploiting the situation."
The report continually stresses the need for joined-up thinking.
Throughout, the authors point out that with the arrival of every new regiment – at its height Operation Banner saw almost 30,000 soldiers supporting the RUC – it was a case of "re-inventing the wheel" as new officers tried to come to terms with the situation on the ground.
It is also noted that the solution to the northern problem could not involve one group alone but required a multi-agency approach.
Acknowledging the need to deal with underlying problems, the authors note: "Simplistically, the long-term solution was not to deploy three battalions into the Divis flats but rather to bulldoze them and build decent respectable homes with proper amenities."
The critique suggests that all the military structures which "eventually defeated PIRA" were in place by 1980, although it took another 25 years for its armed campaign to be ended.
The military leaders also highlight what they describe as the IRA's "effective information campaign", pointing out throughout the review the ability of the organisation and the "republican press" to exploit situations for propaganda reasons.
In their conclusions, they say that there was a need to address perceptions of the British army held by the public but there was equally a need for security forces to have "effective cultural understanding".
However, the analysis of the thinking of paramilitary members is peculiar.
"Much of the motivation of the terrorist came through a wish to glamourise a somewhat third-rate way of life, through esteem amongst the republican community or, more simply, in bars or with women," the authors conclude.
